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Abstract:  Policymakers and economists disagree about the impact of bank regulations on 
the distribution of income.  Exploiting cross-state and cross-time variation, we test whether 
liberalizing restrictions on intra-state branching in the United States intensified, 
ameliorated, or had no effect on income distribution.  We find that branch deregulation 
lowered income inequality.  Deregulation lowered income inequality by affecting labor 
market conditions, not by boosting the business income of the poor, nor by enhancing 
educational attainment.  Reductions in the earnings gap between men and women and 
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 Throughout the history of the United States, income distributional considerations have 
shaped policies toward banks (Hammond, 1957). Besides constitutional concerns, Thomas 
Jefferson’s fears that concentrated banking power would help only the wealthy spurred him to 
fight against the Bank of the United States. Similar anxieties fueled the termination of this bank in 
1811 and Andrew Jackson’s veto of the re-chartering of the Second Bank of the Unites States in 
1832.   
 The view that the unconstrained expansion of powerful banks hurts the poor finds support 
in modern economic theory and continues to motivate bank regulations around the world. If 
banking is a natural monopoly, then unregulated, monopolistic banks may earn rents through high 
fixed fees that disproportionately curtail the economic opportunities of the poor. Based on this 
argument, politicians in many U.S. states implemented and maintained regulatory restrictions on 
bank branching for much of the 20th century (Southworth, 1928; White, 1982). Furthermore, most 
countries regulate bank mergers and acquisitions, with the advertised goals of enhancing 
competition, reducing borrowing costs, and expanding access to bank loans (Barth et al, 2006).  
 Countervailing arguments, however, challenge the view that regulations on bank expansion 
help the poor. These regulations could hinder competition and thereby raise lending fees and hurt 
the poor. Indeed, Flannery (1984) shows that U.S. branching restrictions prevented banks from 
competing in distant areas. This created and protected local banking monopolies, allowing them to 
maintain high lending rates and fees (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1998). Furthermore, from a political 
economy perspective, Acemoglu (2007), Haber (2007), Kroszner and Strahan (1999), and White 
(1982) argue that governments frequently enact entry barriers to protect favored groups, not to 
promote aggregate efficiency and economic growth. From this perspective, income distributional 
effects frequently play a leading role in determining bank regulations. 
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 In this paper, we provide the first assessment of the impact of bank branching regulations 
on the distribution of income. From the 1970s through the 1990s, most states in the United States 
removed restrictions on intra-state branching. We test whether liberalizing these restrictions 
intensified, ameliorated, or had no effect on income inequality. We also evaluate different theories 
of the particular channels linking deregulation and income distribution.  
 Our examination builds directly on past work showing that liberalizing restrictions on 
intra-state branching (i) increased the average size of banks through consolidation (Calem, 1994; 
Savage, 1993) and (ii) lowered the borrowing costs paid by firms (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1998). 
We do not re-examine the empirical chain running from deregulation to intensified bank 
competition and lower borrowing costs.  Rather, we assess the impact of intra-state branch 
deregulation on the distribution of income, which has been a central -- if not the central -- front in 
the battle over bank regulations. 
 Methodologically, the deregulation of intra-state branching provides a natural setting for 
identifying and assessing the impact of regulatory reform on the distribution of income. Kroszner 
and Strahan (1999) show that national technological innovations triggered deregulation, which 
was exogenous to income distributional changes within individual states.  Specifically, (1) the 
invention of automatic teller machines (ATMs), in conjunction with court rulings that ATMs are 
not bank branches, weakened the geographical bond between customers and banks; (2) checkable 
money market mutual funds facilitated banking by mail and telephone, which weakened local 
bank monopolies; and, (3) improvements in communications technology lowered the costs of 
using distant banks. These innovations reduced the monopoly power of local banks, and therefore 
weakened their ability and desire to fight deregulation. Kroszner and Strahan (1999) further show 
that cross-state variation in the timing of deregulation reflects the interactions of these 
technological innovations with preexisting conditions.  For example, deregulation occurred later in 
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states where politically powerful groups viewed large, multiple-branch banks as potential 
competitors.  Thus, the driving forces behind deregulation and its timing were largely independent 
of state-level changes in income distribution. Consequently, we exploit cross-state, cross-year 
variation in income distribution and deregulation to assess the impact of a single policy change on 
different state economies.  
   The paper’s major finding is that deregulation of branching restrictions reduced income 
inequality.  This finding is robust to using different measures of income inequality, examining 
different components of income, controlling for time-varying state characteristics, and 
conditioning on state and year fixed effects.  Furthermore, the impact of deregulation on income 
distribution varies across states in ways that are fully consistent with Kroszner and Strahan’s 
(1999) political economy assessment of branch deregulation. Moreover, we find no evidence that 
reverse causality affects the results. While income inequality widened in the U.S. during the 
sample period, we show that branch deregulation lowered income inequality relative to this 
national trend. The magnitude is consequential. Deregulation explains about 60% of the de-
trended variation of income inequality relative to state and year averages. Moreover, deregulation 
reduced income inequality by exerting a disproportionately positive impact on the poor, not by 
hurting the rich. 
 The two major theoretical explanations for this finding stress the enhanced ability of the 
poor to access banking services following deregulation. The first explanation focuses on the 
funding of human capital accumulation. In Galor and Zeira (1993), for example, the high cost of 
acquiring human capital together with capital market imperfections prevent the poor from 
borrowing to fund education, which intensifies the inter-generational persistence of relative 
income differences. Deregulation that reduces credit market imperfections, therefore, permits 
more poor individuals to finance their education, reducing income inequality. A second 
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explanation focuses on the ability of the poor to become entrepreneurs (Banerjee and Newman, 
1993). Financial imperfections are particularly binding on the poor because they lack collateral 
and because their incomes are relatively low compared to the fixed costs of obtaining a bank loan. 
Thus, branch deregulation that improves bank efficiency by lowering collateral requirements and 
borrowing costs will disproportionately benefit the poor by expanding their access to bank credit. 
 We find, however, that neither of these two theories directly accounts for much of the 
reduction in income inequality explained by bank deregulation. First, branch deregulation has no 
effect on high school or college educational attainment. Second, the impact of branch deregulation 
levels-off quickly. Relative to state and year fixed effects, the Gini coefficient of income 
inequality falls for six years after deregulation and then stops falling. Deregulation has a level 
effect that fully materializes in six years, not a trend effect. The time pattern seems inconsistent 
with the education explanation, which implies a growing effect on income distribution as the poor 
accumulate education. Third, the impact of deregulation on proprietor income accounts for only 
7% of the explained reduction in income inequality. Although Black and Strahan (2002) show that 
branch deregulation spurred the entry of new firms, changes in entrepreneurial income account for 
exceptionally little of branch deregulation’s impact on income distribution.  
 Rather, we show that a tightening of the distribution of wage earnings accounts for almost 
70% of the explained reduction in total income inequality, suggesting that branch deregulation 
reduces inequality primarily by affecting labor market conditions. In particular, deregulation has 
differential effects on labor by skill and gender.  First, deregulation increases the wage income of 
unskilled workers relative to skilled workers.  Since unskilled workers tend to earn less than 
skilled workers, this narrowing of the earnings gap reduces overall income inequality.  Second, 
deregulation reduces the wage income gap between men and women, pushing up women’s wage 
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income relative to men’s income. Since, on average, women earn less than men, deregulation 
helped reduce total income inequality by reducing the gender income gap. 
 This paper relates to an enormous literature on the determinants and consequences of the 
distribution of income. First, the international policy community increasingly emphasizes the 
benefits of providing the poor with greater access to financial services as a vehicle for fighting 
poverty and reducing income inequality. While the experience of branch deregulation within U.S. 
states may not generalize perfectly to developing economies, the results do raise the possibility 
that financial development helps the poor primarily by boosting wage income, not by increasing 
the business income of the poor.  This warrants further research.  Second, many authors examine 
income redistribution as a mechanism for reducing the inefficient propagation of relative incomes 
across generations (Aghion, Caroli, and Garcia-Penalosa, 1999; Galor and Moav, 2006).  Unlike 
financial liberalization, however, redistribution has adverse incentive effects. Thus, our work 
contributes to the policy debate on how to address socially inefficient income inequality. Third, 
we contribute to recent cross-country analyses of finance and the distribution of income.  Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2007) find that banking sector development reduces income 
inequality and poverty. In contrast, we analyze the impact of a specific, exogenous policy change 
on the distribution of income, rather than examining an overall index of financial sector 
development.  By using the differences-in-differences approach across U.S. states, a consistent 
source of income inequality data, and a specific policy event, we increase the power of the 
econometric tests, reduce potential biases due to measurement error, and reduce concerns about 
omitted variables and endogeneity. 
 This paper also relates to a substantive body of work on the effects of branch deregulation. 
Researchers examine the impact of intra-state branch deregulation on economic growth (Jayaratne 
and Strahan, 1996; Huang, 2007), the entry of non-financial companies (Black and Strahan, 2002), 
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and income volatility (Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and Sorensen, 2007; Acharya, Imbs and Sturgess, 
2007). Focusing on rent-sharing and discrimination, Black and Strahan (2001) show that 
deregulation reduced the wage rate gap between men and women bank executives.  We look 
beyond the banking industry and ask whether bank deregulation affected the overall distribution of 
income distribution, as well as the gender and skill gap throughout the entire economy. Demyanyk 
(2007) finds a positive impact of branch deregulation on income growth of proprietors, with the 
impact stronger for women and minorities than for men, while Jerzmanowski and Nabar (2007) 
argue that bank deregulation increases the skill premium.  In this paper, we show that (1) 
deregulation reduces overall income inequality, inequality among proprietors, and inequality 
among wage earners, (2) deregulation reduces overall income inequality primarily by tightening 
the distribution of wage income, while the reduction in income inequality among proprietors 
accounts for very little of the reduction in overall income inequality and (3) deregulation reduces 
income inequality primarily by reducing the income gap between men and women and between 
skilled and unskilled workers. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 1 describes the data and 
econometric methodology. Section 2 provides the core results on the impact of deregulation on the 
distribution of income, while Section 3 provides further evidence on how deregulation influences 
labor market conditions. Section 4 concludes. 
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1. Data and Methodology 
 To assess the effect of branching deregulation on income distribution, we gather data on 
the timing of deregulation, income distribution, and other banking sector and state-level 
characteristics. This section presents the data and describes the econometric methodologies.  
 
 1.1. Branch deregulation 
 Historically, most U.S. states had restrictions on branching within and across state borders. 
Beginning in the early 1970s, however, many states started relaxing these restrictions, allowing 
bank holding companies to consolidate subsidiaries into branches and permitting de novo 
branching throughout the state. This deregulation led to significant entry into local banking 
markets (Amel and Liang, 1992), consolidation of smaller banks into large bank holding 
companies (Calem, 1994) and conversion of existing bank subsidiaries into branches (McLaughin, 
1995).   This relaxation, however, came gradually, with the last state lifting restrictions following 
the 1994 passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act.  An 
extensive literature has assessed the impact of this gradual branch deregulation on economic 
growth, entrepreneurial activity and other banking sector and real economy outcomes.  The intra-
state branching deregulation was often accompanied by inter-state branching deregulation, which 
allowed banking holding companies to expand across state borders. The literature, however, has 
found little effect of inter-state branching deregulation on banking market structure or real 
outcomes.  Similarly, we find no relation between inter-state branch deregulation and the 
distribution of income. Hence, we focus on intra-state branch deregulation.  
 Consistent with Amel (1993), Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), and others, we choose the date 
of deregulation as the date on which a state permitted branching via mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) through the holding company structure. This was typically the first step in the 
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deregulation process, followed by de novo branching.  Table A1 presents the deregulation dates.1  
Twelve states deregulated before the start of our sample period in 1976. Arkansas, Iowa and 
Minnesota were the last states to deregulate, only after the passage of the Riegle-Neal Act in 1994. 
 
 1.2. Income distribution data 
Information on the distribution of income is from the March Supplement of the Current 
Population Survey (CPS), which is a survey of about 60,000 households across the states of the 
U.S. The CPS provides information on total personal income, income from wages, proprietor 
income, as well as detailed demographic information. The CPS is not a true panel; it is cross-
sectional survey that is repeated each year. The CPS does not trace individuals through time, but 
rather replaces 50% of the sample each year, so that each household is included for two 
consecutive years. Each individual is assigned a sample weight corresponding to his or her 
representativeness in the sample, which we use in our analyses. 
We measure the distribution of income for each state and year over the period 1976-2005 
in four ways. First, the natural logarithm of the Gini coefficient of income distribution is derived 
from the Lorenz curve (Gini), where larger values imply greater income inequality. Our second 
measure of income distribution is the coefficient of variation of income, i.e. the variance of 
income divided by the mean (Variance). Third, we use the difference between the natural 
logarithm of incomes of those at the 90th percentile and those at the 10th percentile (90/10).  
Finally, we use the difference between the natural logarithm of incomes of those at the 75th 
percentile and those at the 25th percentile (75/25).   
                                                 
1 We have data for 50 states and the District of Columbia. Consistent with the literature on branch deregulation, we 
drop Delaware and South Dakota because the structure of their banking systems were heavily affected by laws that 
made them centers for the credit card industry, and because South Dakota lacks some financial and banking data. 
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We start our analysis using income data for 1976 because this is when the CPS begins 
identifying individuals by state. Consistent with studies of the U.S. labor market, our main sample 
(a) includes prime-age (25-54) black and white civilians, (b) excludes people living in group 
quarters, those with missing observations on demographic characteristics, and a few individuals 
for which the CPS assigns a zero sampling weight, and (c) corrects for top-coding and translates 
income to constant 1990 dollars.2  Table 1, Panel A provides details on the construction of the 
sample, while Panel B presents summary statistics on the individuals in the sample. 
Table 1 Panel C presents descriptive statistics on the logarithm of the Gini coefficient of 
income inequality. These data are calculated on a state-year basis, so there are 1,433 observations.  
For total individual income, the average Gini across states and over time is 0.48, corresponding to 
an average of -0.74 for the log of Gini. The standard deviation of the log of Gini within states over 
years is 0.56. 
 
 1.3. Control variables 
To control for time-varying changes in a state’s economy, we use the U.S. Department of 
Commerce data to calculate the growth rate of per capita Gross State Product (GSP).  We also 
control for the unemployment rate, obtained from the Bureau of Labor. We also condition on 
government taxes to personal income and government expenditures to personal income in order to 
account for governmental redistribution policies. These data were obtained from the U.S. Census 
Bureau.  In further robustness tests, we test whether the impact of deregulation on income 
inequality varies in a predictable way with different state characteristics at the time of 
                                                 
2 Following the usual practice in analyses of income distribution using the CPS data, we inflate top-coded incomes by 
a factor of 1.5. For purposes of confidentiality the CPS does not report exact incomes above a certain threshold. 
Instead, these incomes are grouped into a single category called the “top-code”. The top-code changes across years 
and types of income. Furthermore, consistent with usual practices, we drop all allocated incomes, i.e., incomes that 
were originally missing but were assigned a non-missing value by the CPS based on demographic characteristics of 
the respondents. 
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deregulation. As we discuss below, we control for the interaction of branch deregulation with a 
unit banking indicator, the small bank share, the small firm share and population dispersion, each 
of which we measure in the year before deregulation.  Data on the share of small firms and banks 
are from Kroszner and Strahan (1999). Data on population dispersion are from the U.S. Census 
Bureau.  
 
 1.4. Methodology 
 We use a differences-in-differences specification to assess the relationship between branch 
deregulation and income distribution, based on the following regression set-up: 
Ys,t = αs + βt + γDs,t + δXs,t + εs,t,        s=1,…,49;     t=1976,…,2005  (1) 
where Ys,t is a measure of income distribution in state s in year t, α and β are vectors of state and 
year fixed-effects, Xs,t is a set of time-varying, state-level variables and ε is the error term.  The 
variable of interest is Ds,t, a dummy variable that takes on the value one the year after state s 
deregulates. The coefficient, γ, therefore indicates the impact of branch deregulation on income 
distribution.  A positive and significant γ suggests that deregulation exerts a positive effect on the 
degree of income inequality, while a negative and significant γ indicates that deregulation pushed 
income inequality lower. Consistent with past work on branch deregulation, we drop the year of 
deregulation. In total, we have data for 48 states plus the District of Columbia, over 30 years, 
minus 37 state-years in which deregulation occurred. Thus, 1,433 state-year observations serve as 
the basis for our analysis. 
 The differences-in differences estimation technique allows us to control for omitted 
variables.  We include time-specific dummy variables to control for economy-wide shocks that 
might drive income distribution over time, such as business cycles, long-term trends in income 
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distribution, and changes in female labor force participation across the country. We include state-
specific dummy variables to control for time-invariant, unobserved state characteristics that shape 
income distribution across states.  The coefficient γ therefore measures the effect of branching 
deregulation relative to the average income distribution over time in state i and relative to average 
income distribution across all states in year t.  We estimate regression (1) allowing for state-level 
clustering, i.e. allowing for correlations in the error terms over time within states.3 
  
2. Branch deregulation and income distribution 
 2.1. Main results 
The Table 2 results show a strong negative and significant relationship between branching 
deregulation and the Gini coefficient.  The branching deregulation dummy enters negatively and 
significantly at the 5% level in all seven regressions.  The column 1 result suggests that relative to 
the state- and year-specific averages, branching deregulation results in a 2.6 percentage point drop 
in the Gini coefficient. To gauge the economic effect of this result, we compare the coefficient 
estimate to the de-trended standard deviation of Gini, which is computed after accounting for state 
and year effects.  This standard deviation is 0.041 (Table 1), suggesting that branching 
deregulation explains about 60% of the variation of log Gini relative to state and year averages. In 
contrast to the influential view that regulatory restrictions on bank branching protected the poor 
from the adverse effects of large banks, we find that deregulation reduced income inequality. 
                                                 
3Consistent with Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), we also confirm our results when reducing the time-series 
dimension of the data as follows: (i) estimate a version of equation (1) that includes only state and year dummy 
variables, (ii) compute the residuals, es,t,, (iii) average over the pre-deregulation years to obtain es,pre and average over 
the post-deregulation years to obtain es,post, and (iv) for only those states that experienced deregulation during the 
sample period, run a pooled regression of es,post  and  es,pre  on a constant and a dummy variable, ds, that equals one for 
es,post  and zero for  es,pre.  We find that ds enters negatively and significantly, indicating that deregulation reduces 
income inequality. 
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Regressions 2 through 7 show the robustness of our findings to controlling for other 
potential time-varying state-level factors associated with income inequality.  The column 2 
regressions shows that there is no significant relationship between income inequality and the 
growth rate of per capita Gross State Product (GSP), while the column 3 results indicate that a 
higher unemployment rate is associated with higher income inequality. This does not imply that 
per capita economic growth is unrelated to income inequality; rather, it suggests that state-level 
per capita growth is not significantly associated with deviations of state-level income inequality 
from the state and year-average Gini coefficient. The column 4 regression shows that higher tax 
burden on income is associated with higher income inequality, while the column 5 regression 
suggests that higher government spending is associated with lower income inequality.  
Furthermore, jointly controlling for per capita income growth, the unemployment rate, 
government taxation and spending as reported in column 6 does not change the finding that 
deregulation reduces income inequality. The deregulation dummy continues to enter negatively 
and significantly and with a similar coefficient.  In column 7, we add the lagged growth rate of 
Gini. The deregulation dummy variable continues to enter negatively and significantly. In 
unreported regressions, we further show that these results also hold when controlling for the size 
of each state’s aggregate economy, the growth rate of each state’s aggregate economy, the level of 
real per capita income in each state, or lagged values of each state’s Gini coefficient.  Further, this 
paper’s results hold when examining family income, rather than focusing on the income of 
individuals. 
As a robustness test, and to clarify the timing of the impact of deregulation on the 
distribution of income, we examine the dynamics of the relationship between deregulation and the 
distribution of income.  We do this by including a series of dummy variables in the standard 
regression.  In particular, D_xj equals one for all observations in state j that are x years before 
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deregulation, while Dxj equals one for the year x year after deregulation in state j. Figure 1 plots 
the results and the 95% confidence intervals, centering the estimates around year 0, the year of 
deregulation.  
The results indicate that innovations in the distribution of income did not precede 
deregulation and the impact of deregulation on inequality materializes over the six years after 
deregulation. As shown, D_xj is insignificantly different from zero for all years before 
deregulation. This suggests that changes in the distribution of income did not precede 
deregulation. Next, note that inequality falls after deregulation, as D1 is negative.  The impact of 
deregulation on inequality grows and becomes significantly negative three years after 
deregulation. After three years, the impact continues to grow slightly. The full effect of 
deregulation is observed within six years. Deregulation has a level effect on the distribution of 
income, but no trend effect on the Gini coefficient of income inequality. 
 
 2.2. Alternative categories of income and different measures of income distribution 
The negative impact of deregulation on income inequality holds when using different 
categories of income. While Table 2 focused on the Gini coefficient computed using total income, 
Table 3 provides regression results using the Gini coefficient based on wage and salary income 
and on proprietor income.4 As shown in the first column of Table 3, deregulation induces a 
significant drop in inequality using each of these three categories of income. 
The negative relation between removing restrictions on intra-state bank branching and 
income inequality is quite robust to using different measures of income distribution. Beside Gini, 
we present results with (i) the log ratio of the 90th and the 10th percentiles of the income 
                                                 
4 Besides proprietor income and wage and salary income, total income also includes government transfer payments as 
well as income from interest, dividends, and rent. 
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distribution (90/10), (ii) the log ratio of the 75th and the 25th percentiles of the income distribution 
(75/25), and (iii) the log coefficient of variation (Variance). Since we report the results for each 
category of income, Table 3 presents the findings from twelve separate regressions while 
controlling for the unemployment rate, as well as state and year fixed effects. While the negative 
impact of deregulation on income inequality is slightly weaker for the two measures of income 
inequality measures that put greater weight on the tails of the distribution of income (90/10 and 
Variance), the results are very robust when using the Gini and 75/25 measures of inequality.  
The negative relation between deregulation and inequality is significant at the five percent 
level for all of the categories of income when using the Gini and 75/25 measures of inequality. 
Moreover, the 75/25 measure of inequality drops because the income the poorest quarter of the 
population increases, not because the richest 25% become poorer.  In particular, the incomes of 
those at the 25th percentile of the distribution jump 13% in real terms after deregulation 
(significant at the 5% level), while the incomes of those at the 75th percentile do not change 
significantly.  In sum, when not putting too much weight on outliers, deregulation is associated 
with a tightening of the distribution of income when using different categories of income and 
alternative indexes of inequality.   
  
2.3. The impact of deregulation as a function of initial conditions 
We next assess whether the impact of deregulation on the distribution of income varies in 
predictable ways across states with different initial conditions.  If the impact of deregulation on 
income distribution varies in a theoretically predictable manner, this provides greater confidence 
in the conclusions, sheds empirical light on the channels through which deregulation influences 
income distribution, and also reduces concerns about reverse causality. 
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Following Kroszner and Strahan (1999), we expect the impact of deregulation to be 
stronger in states where branch regulation had a more distorting effect on bank behavior prior to 
deregulation. We consider four initial conditions that reflect the distorting effects of branch 
regulation on the economy. First, unit banking was the most extreme form of branching restriction. 
Thus, we expect that deregulation exerted a particularly large, negative impact on income 
inequality in states that had unit banks before they deregulated. Second, one characteristic that 
signals the distorting effect of branching is the degree to which small banks compose a relatively 
large proportion of total state banking assets prior to deregulation.  Thus, we expect that 
deregulation had an especially large impact on inequality in states with a comparatively high ratio 
of small banks at the time of deregulation. Third, small firms tend to have a harder time than large 
firms obtaining credit from banks that are farther away (Berger et al., 1998).  This suggests that 
local banking monopolies protected by branch regulations were particularly strong in states 
dominated by small firms. Thus, we expect that branching deregulation had a bigger impact in 
states with a large proportion of small firms prior to deregulation.  Finally, we examine the 
dispersion of the population.  Local banking monopolies will be particularly well-protected if the 
population is diffuse, so that other banks are more likely to be far away.  This suggests that 
deregulation would have a bigger negative effect on inequality in states with a high initial 
geographic dispersion of people. 
The results support each of these four predictions, as shown in Table 4.  Specifically, 
branch deregulation reduces income inequality more in states that had (a) unit banking (column 2), 
(b) a higher share of small banks (column 3), (c) a larger share of small firms (column 4), and (d) a 
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more dispersed population (column 5).5  In the unit banking and population dispersion regressions, 
the interactions of unit banking with deregulation and population dispersion with deregulation 
enter negatively and significantly at the 5% level (columns 2 and 5), and the deregulation dummy 
variable enters negatively in both of these specifications.  These findings suggest that the effect of 
deregulation on income distribution is stronger both for states that initially had unit banking and 
those with more dispersed populations. In the small banks and small firms regressions (columns 3 
and 4), the interaction of the share of small banks and the deregulation dummy enters significantly 
and negatively at the five percent level. In these two regressions, the deregulation dummy variable 
by itself enters positively. Thus, for these two regressions, we also evaluate the overall effect of 
deregulation at different levels of the small bank share and small firm share, respectively.  The 
results indicate that there was a negative and significant effect of deregulation on income 
inequality only in states with a small bank share or small firm share at or above the median, while 
the impact is insignificant in the other states.  In sum, branch deregulation reduced income 
inequality more in states where regulatory restrictions on bank branching distorted banking 
behavior comparatively more before deregulation. These results are consistent with the view that 
deregulation weakened banking monopolies, intensified bank competition, and tightened the 
distribution of income. 
 
                                                 
5 Following Kroszner and Strahan, we classify the following states as having unit banking before deregulation: 
Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, Texas, Wisconsin, West Virginia, and Wyoming,  
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2.4. Testing for reverse causality 
To test directly for reverse causality, we use a hazard model that assesses whether changes 
in the distribution of income spurred branch deregulation. Following the procedure in Kroszner 
and Strahan (1999), Table 5 reports tests of whether income inequality influences the likelihood 
that a state deregulates in a specific year given that it has not already deregulated.  We only 
include the 37 states that deregulated after 1976.6  As in Kroszner and Strahan (1999), we find that 
states with a larger share of small banks and better capitalized small banks deregulate later, while 
states with a higher share of small firms deregulate earlier.  States where banks are allowed to sell 
insurance products deregulate later if the insurance sector is relatively larger. Finally, states where 
the Democratic Party holds a larger share of political power deregulate later.   
Consistent with our interpretation, the Gini coefficient does not enter significantly in any 
of the Table 5 regressions.  The likelihood that a state deregulates does not change with higher or 
lower income inequality.  This also confirms that our finding of a negative association between 
deregulation and income inequality is not driven by reverse causation. 
 
                                                 
6 While the Kroszner and Strahan sample period starts in 1970, we do not have Gini data available before 1976.  Also, 
since we use the original Kroszner and Strahan dataset, our sample period ends in 1994, when there were three states 
that had not deregulated yet – Arkansas, Iowa and Minnesota.   
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3. How Does Deregulation Affect the Distribution of Income? 
We now empirically assess the two major theoretical explanations of how branch 
deregulation reduces income inequality. These theories are not mutually exclusive. They both rely 
on branch deregulation improving the ability of the poor to access banking services directly.  One 
stresses that the poor use this improved access to purchase more education.  The second 
emphasizes that the poor use the improved access to become entrepreneurs.  Since we do not find 
much empirical support for either explanation, we end this section by providing a detailed 
decomposition of how deregulation affects the distribution of wage and salary income.  
 
3.1. Assessing education theories  
 Galor and Zeira (1993) do not directly examine branch deregulation, but their theory of the 
co-evolution of economic growth and the distribution of income provides a unique framework for 
deriving predictions of how an improvement in the financial sector affects both aggregate growth 
and the distribution of income.  In their model, the high cost of accumulating human capital 
together with financial market imperfections combine to prevent the poor from borrowing to fund 
education. This produces a socially inefficient allocation of schooling that both slows aggregate 
economic growth and perpetuates inefficiently high levels of income inequality.  In the context of 
their theoretical framework, financial reforms that ease financial market imperfections will both 
accelerate growth and reduce inefficient income inequality by allowing talented, but poor, 
individuals to borrow and purchase education.  
 The empirical evidence suggests that human capital accumulation was not the channel 
through which branch deregulation helped reduce income inequality across states in the U.S.  
First, Figure 1 shows that the full effects of deregulation on the distribution of income are realized 
quickly. These dynamics seem inconsistent with the view that branch deregulation eases credit 
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constraints, permitting the poor to accumulate more human capital.  The education explanation 
suggests a growing effect of deregulation on income distribution as the poor accumulate skills. 
There is no evidence of a trend effect of deregulation on inequality.  
More directly, Table 6 shows that branch deregulation did not result in higher educational 
attainment as predicted by theory.  Specifically, we regress the share of the population with at least 
a high school degree and the share of population with at least a college degree on a set of state and 
time dummy variables and the deregulation dummy (columns 1 and 3). Though it would be useful 
to examine enrollment rates, such information is unavailable on a state-year basis. To assess the 
possible long-run effects of deregulation on education, we also use a specification in which we 
employ a set of deregulation dummies that take on the value one for the period (i) five to nine 
years after deregulation, (ii) 10 to 14 years after deregulation, (iii) 15-19 years after deregulation, 
(iv) 20 to 24 years after deregulation, (v) 25 to 29 years after deregulation, and (vi) more than 30 
years after deregulation (column 2 and 4).  Using a set of dummies for different time periods after 
deregulation allows us to test whether there was a medium- to long-term effect of deregulation on 
education.  None of the dummies enters significantly. In sum, the analysis provides little support 
for the view that deregulation boosts education.   
 
3.2. Assessing entrepreneurship theories  
In Banerjee and Newman (1993), financial imperfections represent a particularly severe 
impediment to poor individuals seeking to become entrepreneurs.  This might arise because the 
poor lack collateral or the fixed costs of borrowing are prohibitively high.  In this context, 
financial imperfections (a) retard economic growth by hindering the efficient allocation of capital 
to poor, but talented, individuals and (b) increase inequality by limiting the opportunities of the 
poor. By improving credit markets, deregulation can spur growth and reduce inequality. 
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Our empirical findings suggest that enhanced entrepreneurship directly accounts for very 
little of the impact of deregulation on income distribution.  In particular, we decompose the impact 
of deregulation on the distribution of income into that part accounted for by proprietor income and 
that part accounted for by non-proprietor income, which is wage income, income from interest and 
dividends, and transfer payments. We do this decomposition by using the variance of the 
distribution of income, rather than the Gini coefficient, so that we can employ standard variance 
decomposition techniques described in the Appendix. As shown in Figure 2, the impact of 
deregulation on proprietor income accounts for only 7% of the reduction in total income variance 
explained by branch deregulation.  This does not necessarily suggest that entrepreneurship is 
unimportant for explaining the drop in income inequality. Rather, this findings implies that direct 
changes in entrepreneurial income account for very little of the reduction in income inequality. 
 
3.3. Decomposing the impact of deregulation on wage income  
In light of these results on education and proprietor income, we now provide more 
information on wage income.  First, we simply decompose the drop in the variance of total income 
explained by branch deregulation into that part accounted for by the impact of deregulation on 
wage income and that part accounted for by the impact of deregulation on all other forms of 
income. Thus, we follow the same procedure outlined above for assessing the role of proprietor 
income. When focusing only on wage income, Figure 2 shows that the explained drop in wage 
income accounts for almost 70% of the explained reduction in the variance of total income.   
Since changes in wage and salary income account for the bulk of branch deregulation’s 
impact on the distribution of total income, we explore (1) the difference between skilled and 
unskilled workers and (2) the difference between male and female workers.  An extensive 
literature documents the expanding skill premium in the U.S. labor market, where wage rates of 
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skilled workers are rising faster than those of unskilled workers (e.g., Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce, 
1993; Katz and Autor, 1999). Similarly, an active literature examines the gender gap (e.g., Mincer 
and Polacheck, 1974; Mulligan and Rubinstein, 2007a, b, c).   
We decompose the explained tightening in the distribution of wage income into (i) the 
component associated with a tightening in the distribution of wage income among skilled workers, 
(ii) the component associated with a tightening in the distribution of wage income among 
unskilled workers, and (iii) the component associated with a tightening in the distribution wage 
income between skilled and unskilled workers. We define skilled workers as those who have 
graduated from a four-year college.  As shown in Figure 3, deregulation induced a tightening in all 
three components.  
Critically, 75% of the explained reduction in the variance of wage income is accounted for 
by the explained reduction in the income gap between skilled and unskilled workers.  In terms of 
wage income, deregulation helps unskilled workers relative to skilled ones. Since, unskilled 
workers, on average, earn less than skilled workers, this is consistent with the findings that 
deregulation reduces overall income inequality. 
Next, we conduct the same type of decomposition but focus on gender gap differences.  
We decompose the explained reduction in wage income inequality into that part accounted for by 
a reduction in inequality among men, that part accounted for by a reduction in inequality among 
women, and that part accounted for by a reduction in inequality between men and women.  
As shown in Figure 3, about half of the explained reduction in the variance of wage 
income is accounted for by the explained reduction in the gender income gap. Deregulation boosts 
the incomes of female workers relative to male workers.  Since, on average, women tend to earn 
less than men, this results helps account for the paper’s major finding: deregulation reduces 




 Policymakers and economists disagree sharply about the impact of bank regulations on the 
distribution of income.  While some argue that the unregulated expansion of large banks will 
increase banking fees and reduce the economic opportunities of the poor, others hold that 
regulations restrict competition, protect monopolistic banks, and widen the distribution of income. 
More generally, an influential political economy literature stresses that income distribution 
considerations, rather than efficiency and growth considerations, frequently exert the dominant 
influence on bank regulations (see Claessens and Perotti, 2007, for an overview).  
 We find that liberalizing restrictions on intra-state branching across the states of the U.S. 
tightened the distribution of income. This finding is robust to an array of sensitivity analyses.  We 
find no evidence that reverse causality drives the results. Moreover, the impact of deregulation on 
income distribution varies in a theoretically predictable manner across states with distinct 
economic, financial, and demographic characteristics at the time of deregulation.  Deregulation 
tightened the distribution of income by disproportionately helping the poor, not by hurting the 
rich.  These findings support the view that branch regulation in the United States restricted 
competition, protected local banking monopolies, and impeded the economic opportunities of the 
relatively poor. 
 Even among theories predicting that deregulation will reduce inequality, there are 
disagreements about the mechanisms. The two most influential views, both in terms of economic 
theory and in terms of the policy recommendations of international financial institutions, stress 
direct access.  These two views hold that greater direct access to financial services will 
disproportionately expand the economic opportunities of the poor by enhancing their educational 
and entrepreneurial opportunities.  We find no evidence that branch deregulation enhances 
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educational attainment. Furthermore, while branch deregulation stimulates entrepreneurship 
(Black and Strahan, 2002), changes in entrepreneurial income account for very little of the 
reduction in income inequality generated by branch deregulation in the United States. 
 Rather, deregulation lowered income inequality by affecting labor market conditions. Most 
of the explained drop in income inequality is due to (1) a reduction in the wage income differential 
between skilled and unskilled workers and (2) a reduction in the wage income gap between men 
and women. 
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Appendix: Variance Decomposition 
To provide additional information on the impact of deregulation on income distribution, 
we decompose the explained reduction in income inequality into different components. We use the 
variance of the distribution of income, rather than the Gini coefficient, so that we can perform a 
standard, variance decomposition. 
In particular, let Z ≡ X+Y, where, for example, Z is total income, X is income from labor, 
and Y is income from non-labor sources, such as proprietor income and income from dividends 
and interest payments. By definition, Var(Z) = Var(X) + Var(Y) + 2Cov(X,Y). 
Next, define the change in the variation of Z explained by bank deregulation as 
∆Var(Z) ≡  [Var(Z)]after - [Var(Z)]before 
               =  [Var(X)+Var(Y)+2Cov(X,Y)]after  - [Var(X)+Var(Y)+2Cov(X,Y)]before  
               = ∆Var(X) + ∆Var(Y) + 2∆Cov(X,Y). 
In this context, "before" and "after" refer to the period before and after bank deregulation, 
respectively. To link this directly with the survey data, we must complicate this formula by 
accounting for the different weights on the sources of income, so that Z ≡ αX + (1-α)Y, where α is 
the share of income from labor and 1-α is the share of income from non-labor sources. Thus, 
 
∆Var(Z) = α²∆Var(X) + (1-α)²∆Var(Y) + 2α(1-α)∆Cov(X,Y). 
1      = [α²∆Var(X)/∆Var(Z)[ + [(1-α)²∆Var(Y)/∆Var(Z)] + [2α(1-α)∆Cov(X,Y)/ ∆Var(Z)]. 
 
The first term, [α²∆Var(X)/∆Var(Z)], represents the fraction of the change in the variance 
of Z accounted for by the change in the variance within X; the second term, [(1-
α)²∆Var(Y)/∆Var(Z)], represents the fraction of the change in the variance of Z accounted for by 
the change in the variance within Y, while the final term, [2α(1-α)∆Cov(X,Y)/ ∆Var(Z)], 
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represents the fraction of the change in the variance of Z accounted for by the change between X 
and Y. 
We compute ∆Var(Z), ∆Var(X), ∆Var(Y), and Cov(X,Y) from four regressions. 
Specifically, controlling for state and year fixed effects, we regress Var(Z), Var(X), Var(Y), and 
Cov(X,Y) on the state-specific bank deregulation indictor, Di,t, that equals one after the state 
deregulated branching restrictions, and zero before the deregulation. Let β, γ, δ, and ψ be the 
estimated coefficients on Di,t in the regressions where Var(Z), Var(X), Var(Y), and Cov(X,Y) are 
the dependent variables respectively. 
  Thus, the explained changes in the variances and covariances are ∆Var(Z) = β, ∆Var(X) = 
γ, ∆Var(Y) = δ, and ∆Cov(X,Y) = ψ. Since we also know α we can decompose the total explained 
change in the variation of Z into the change in variation within X, the change in variation within 
Y, and the change in variation between X and Y. 
In some cases, we further decompose the covariance term and allocate the between effect 
to either X or Y.  For example, in the case of decomposing total income into wage- and non-wage 
income, we want to assess whether changes in the variance of wage income inequality dominate 
the explained reductions in total income inequality.  For the purposes of this paper, we are not 
interested in assessing the fraction of the explained reduction in income inequality accounted for 
by changes in the variance of income between wage and non-wage income.  However, when we 
decompose income by gender, we are very interested in assessing the fraction of the explained 
reduction in income inequality that is accounted for by the explained reduction in incomes 
between men and women.  
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Thus, for some decompositions, we allocate the covariance term as follows: 
 
(A2) ∆Var(Z) = [α²∆Var(X)+2α(1-α)w∆Cov(X,Y)] + [(1-α)²∆Var(Y)+2α(1-α)(1-w)∆Cov(X,Y)] 
 
where w is the change in average wage income (x)  relative to the change in average total income 
z, so that w=∆x/∆z. Intuitively, the component of the explained change in the variance of total 
income accounted for by a reduction in the variance between groups X and Y, 2α(1-α)∆Cov(X,Y), 
can be further decomposed into that part associated with a change in average wage income and 
that part associated with a change in average non-wage income. Therefore, the change in total 
variance attributable to the change in variance of wage income is the change of variance within 
wage income plus the weighted contribution of wage income to the covariance term. 
The first term in the above expression, [α²∆Var(X)+2α(1-α)w∆Cov(X,Y)], is the explained 
change in total variance attributable to the explained change in X (wage income), and the second 
term,  [(1-α)²∆Var(Y)+2α(1-α)(1-w)∆Cov(X,Y)], is the explained change in total income 
attributable to the explained change in Y (non-wage income). In the paper, we conduct this 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
A. Data Construction        
     






left   
              
        
CPS sample years 1977-2006     4,878,496   
Adult civilians, aged 25-54, in households   3,044,675 62.4% 1,833,821   
Whites and blacks only   300,726 16.4% 1,533,095   
Non-allocated incomes with positive sampling weights  98,773 6.4% 1,434,322   
        
B. Sample Statistics N Mean Min Max    
             
        
White 1,434,322 0.87 0 1    
Education: High school or more 1,434,322 0.89 0 1    
Education: College or more 1,434,322 0.27 0 1    
Self-employed 1,434,322 0.09 0 1    
Work for wages 1,434,322 0.73 0 1    
Not in the labor force 1,434,322 0.18 0 1    
        
C. Statistics on the Gini Coefficient of Income Distribution   Standard deviation 
        
     








                
        
Log(Gini):        
Total income 1,433 
-
0.745 -1.013 -0.531 0.056 0.056 0.041 
Wage and salary income 1,433 
-
0.947 -1.174 -0.715 0.056 0.055 0.049 
Proprietor (self-employed) income 1,433 
-
0.368 -1.199 0.127 0.11 0.116 0.093 
                
        
Note: A) The table is based on the March Demographic Supplements to the Current Population Surveys (CPS) corresponding to income received 
in years 1976-2005 for prime-age (25-54) adult civilians.  The sample is restricted to whites and blacks who do not reside in institutions and 
excludes individuals with allocated incomes. Finally, we eliminate 21 persons that are assigned a zero sampling weight by the CPS. B) For panel 
B, we use the sampling weights provided by the CPS. C) The Gini indexes were calculated for each state and year, for the 30 years between 1976 
and 2005 and for 48 states and the District of Columbia, excluding South Dakota and Delaware. We exclude the year of deregulation, which drops 
37 observations (37 states deregulated between 1976 and 2005).  Thus, there are 1,433 state-year observations in the sample. All incomes are 









Table 2 - The Effect of Deregulation on the Distribution of Income 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Deregulation -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.024** -0.026*** -0.024** -0.023** -0.021*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
        
GSP per capita growth  -0.055    -0.045 -0.030 
  (0.045)    (0.046) (0.040) 
        
Unemployment rate   0.005***   0.006*** 0.007*** 
   (0.002)   (0.002) (0.002) 
        
Gov taxes / income    0.295**  0.436** 0.342*** 
    (0.114)  (0.170) (0.099) 
        
Gov expenditures / income     -0.301* -0.479** -0.441** 
     (0.152) (0.179) (0.210) 
        
Gini growth, t-1       0.114*** 
       (0.033) 
        
Observations 1433 1433 1433 1335 1335 1335 1239 
R-squared 0.464 0.465 0.473 0.480 0.481 0.500 0.470 
                
        
Note: Standard errors are adjusted for state-level clustering and appear in parentheses. All models control for state and year fixed effects. 
The dependent variable is ln(Gini) which is based on total personal income. The sample is described in the note to Table 1. Data on 
government taxes and expenditures are only available until 2003. A * indicates significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; and *** 




















Table 3 - The Effect of Deregulation on Income Distribution by Type of Income 
 
  
Gini 90/10 75/25 Variance 
     
A. Total income     
Deregulation -0.024** -0.250 -0.155*** -0.065* 
 (0.009) (0.199) (0.055) (0.037) 
     
Unemployment rate 0.005*** 0.150*** 0.017** -0.005 
 (0.002) (0.040) (0.008) (0.007) 
     
Observations 1433 1433 1433 1433 
R-squared 0.473 0.816 0.599 0.592 
     
     
B. Wage and salary income     
Deregulation -0.021*** -0.102*** -0.050*** -0.058 
 (0.007) (0.030) (0.013) (0.036) 
     
Unemployment rate 0.010*** 0.091*** 0.024*** 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.008) 
     
Observations 1433 1433 1433 1433 
R-squared 0.247 0.470 0.359 0.595 
     
     
C. Proprietor income     
Deregulation -0.047** -0.318* -1.471*** -0.124** 
 (0.020) (0.169) (0.459) (0.059) 
     
Unemployment rate -0.004 -0.076** -0.064 -0.013 
 (0.003) (0.034) (0.068) (0.011) 
     
Observations 1433 1394 1432 1433 
R-squared 0.369 0.039 0.335 0.165 
          
     
Note: Standard errors are adjusted for state-level clustering and appear in parentheses. All models 
control for state and year fixed effects. The sample is described in the notes to Table 1. The 
dependent variables are as follows:  The natural logarithm of the Gini coefficient of income 
distribution (Gini) in column (1), the difference between natural logarithm of the 90th and 10th 
percentiles of the distribution of income (90/10) in column (2); the difference between natural 
logarithm of the 75th and 25th percentiles of the distribution of income (75/25) in column (3), and 
the natural logarithm of the coefficient of variation of income (Variance), which is the variance 
divided by the mean, in column (4). For some state-years the 10th, and in one case the 25th, 
percentiles of the total income distribution are zero. In order to take logs we therefore inflated zero 
income by 1 dollar for the 10th percentile and by 2 dollars for the 25th percentile. We followed a 
similar procedure for proprietor income. A * indicates significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; 





Table 4 - The Effect of Deregulation on Gini as a Function of Initial State Characteristics 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Deregulation -0.026*** -0.009 0.024 0.577* -0.017* 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.015) (0.294) (0.009) 
(Deregulation x unit banking)  -0.032***    
  (0.010)    
(Deregulation x initial share of small banks)   -0.351***   
   (0.129)   
(Deregulation x initial share of small firms)    -0.672*  
    (0.334)  
(Deregulation x initial population dispersion)     -0.210*** 
     (0.071) 
Linear combinations      
      
Deregulation + (Deregulation x initial share of small banks):      
      
evaluated at the 25th percentile of the small banks distribution   -0.000   
   (0.008)   
evaluated at the median of the small banks distribution   -0.013*   
   (0.007)   
evaluated at the 75th percentile of the small banks distribution   -0.026***   
   (0.009)   
Deregulation + (Deregulation x initial share of small firms):      
      
evaluated at the 25th percentile of the small firms distribution    -0.008  
    (0.008)  
evaluated at the median of the small firms distribution    -0.015**  
    (0.007)  
evaluated at the 75th percentile of the small firms distribution    -0.025***  
    (0.009)  
      
Observations 1433 1433 1133 1133 1433 
R-squared 0.464 0.476 0.541 0.531 0.473 
            
      
Note: Standard errors are adjusted for state-level clustering and appear in parentheses. All models control for state and year fixed effects. The sample is described in the 
notes to Table 1. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the Gini coefficient of total personal income (Gini). The first column replicates the results reported in 
the second column in Table 2.  Since we control for state fixed effects and since unit banking, initial share of small banks, initial share of small firms, and initial population 
dispersion are time-invariant, the direct effect of unit banking, initial share of small banks, initial share of small firms, and initial population dispersion are dropped from 
the regressions. The data on the share of small banks and small firms is obtained from Kroszner and Strahan (1999). These data exclude 10 states that deregulated in 1960 









Table 5 - Reverse Causality 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Small bank share 4.562*** 4.554*** 3.767*** 3.776*** 3.710** 3.498*** 
 (1.199) (1.242) (1.167) (1.183) (1.467) (0.938) 
Relative small bank capital-asset ratio 7.470*** 7.469*** 5.978** 5.997** 6.058** 3.955 
 (2.811) (2.802) (2.557) (2.803) (2.792) (2.706) 
Relative Insurance Value added -0.956*** -0.946*** -1.338*** -1.016*** -1.027*** -0.442 
 (0.299) (0.354) (0.316) (0.265) (0.338) (0.316) 
Banks allowed to sell insurance -1.168** -1.164** -1.155** -1.148** -1.143** -0.439 
 (0.561) (0.568) (0.484) (0.559) (0.563) (0.424) 
Relative Insurance Value added*Banks 3.198** 3.185** 3.147*** 3.089** 3.069** 1.044 
allowed to sell insurance (1.299) (1.333) (1.113) (1.297) (1.315) (1.014) 
Share of firms that are small -5.505*** -5.523*** -4.570** -5.116*** -5.074*** -10.176*** 
 (2.031) (1.935) (1.857) (1.836) (1.943) (2.119) 
Share of govt. controlled by Democrats 0.241** 0.240** 0.218** 0.194** 0.192** 0.135* 
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.085) (0.084) (0.088) (0.072) 
Single party controls whole state govt. -0.025 -0.025 -0.016 -0.002 -0.002 0.108 
 (0.061) (0.063) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.077) 
Gini coefficient -0.013 -0.013 -0.019 -0.007 -0.007 -0.015 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.010) 
Interest rate spread  0.164     
  (3.323)     
Bank failure rate   1.999***    
   (0.774)    
Unit banking    0.122** 0.124** 0.214*** 
    (0.055) (0.061) (0.077) 
State changes bank insurance powers     -0.011 -0.127 
     (0.109) (0.105) 
       
Includes regional dummies No No No No No Yes 
Constant 8.005*** 8.011*** 7.734*** 7.473*** 7.464*** 12.423*** 
 (1.778) (1.736) (1.503) (1.573) (1.582) (1.719) 
       
LnP 1.799*** 1.802*** 1.952*** 1.830*** 1.830*** 2.058*** 
 (0.148) (0.193) (0.175) (0.149) (0.148) (0.156) 
RC 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log-Likelihood 9.46 9.46 10.79 10.81 10.82 21.72 
Number of Observations 408 408 408 408 408 408 
p-value of Chi-Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
              
       
Note: This table replicates Table III from Kroszner and Strahan (1999). The model is a Weibull hazard model where the dependent variable is the log 
expected time to deregulation. All variables, including the Gini index, are included in levels. Sample period Is 1976 to 1994 and the sample 
comprises 37 states that deregulated after 1977. States drop from the sample once they deregulate. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. A * 




Table 6 - The Effect of Deregulation on Educational Attainment 
  
 
% High school + 
 
% College + 
      
Deregulation 0.006   -0.003  
 (0.007)   (0.005)  
      
5-9 yrs after deregulation  -0.000   0.002 
  (0.004)   (0.002) 
      
10-14 yrs after deregulation  0.001   0.001 
  (0.007)   (0.004) 
      
15-19 yrs after deregulation  0.005   0.005 
  (0.011)   (0.006) 
      
20-24 yrs after deregulation  0.006   0.012* 
  (0.013)   (0.007) 
      
25-29 yrs after deregulation  0.002   0.011 
  (0.013)   (0.008) 
      
30+ yrs after deregulation  -0.015   0.009 
  (0.018)   (0.009) 
      
Observations 1385 1421  1385 1421 
R-squared 0.901 0.904   0.806 0.808 
      
Notes: Standard errors are adjusted for state-level clustering and appear in parentheses. 
All models control for state and year fixed effects. The sample is similar to the one 
described in the notes to Table 1, except that in this table the period is 1977-2005 rather 
than 1976-2005. In columns (1) and (3) the year of deregulation is dropped. In columns 
(2) and (4), each right-hand side variable equals one for the indicated period. A * 






Table A1 -- Branching Deregulation Events 
State State  code Year of deregulation 
Alabama AL 1981 
Alaska AK 1960 
Arizona AZ 1960 
Arkansas AR 1994 
California CA 1960 
Colorado CO 1991 
Connecticut CT 1980 
District of Columbia DC 1960 
Florida FL 1988 
Georgia GA 1983 
Hawaii HI 1986 
Idaho ID 1960 
Illinois IL 1988 
Indiana IN 1989 
Iowa IA 1999 
Kansas KS 1987 
Kentucky KY 1990 
Louisiana LA 1988 
Maine ME 1975 
Maryland MD 1960 
Massachusetts MA 1984 
Michigan MI 1987 
Minnesota MN 1993 
Mississippi MS 1986 
Missouri MO 1990 
Montana MT 1990 
Nebraska NE 1985 
Nevada NV 1960 
New Hampshire NH 1987 
New Jersey NJ 1977 
New Mexico NM 1991 
New York NY 1976 
North Carolina NC 1960 
North Dakota ND 1987 
Ohio OH 1979 
Oklahoma OK 1988 
Oregon OR 1985 
Pennsylvania PA 1982 
Rhode Island RI 1960 
South Carolina SC 1960 
Tennessee TN 1985 
Texas TX 1988 
Utah UT 1981 
Vermont VT 1970 
Virginia VA 1978 
Washington WA 1985 
West Virginia WV 1987 
Wisconsin WI 1990 
Wyoming WY 1988 
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